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1. The Prewar Situations 
Maize has been a main staple food of the African people 
of Kenya since the beginning of this century. If has been 
grown by African mostly for subsistence, but a fair proportion 
of total supply has come onto the market as a surplus to 
subsistence production. 
The rapid expansion of European maize production started 
in 1922 as the result of a recommendation by the Bowring 
Committee that Kenya should concentrate on the production of 
maize in order to increase the value of the Colony's exports 
and to provide bulk freight for the Railway. Also encouragement 
was given to African growers to produce superior quality maize 
for export, and plantings of the 'Flat White' variety of maize 
gradually became common in the native reserves. 
The Great Depression of the early 1930's hit the European 
maize growers especially hard as a much larger proportion of 
their maize was sent to the export markets. Despite the relief 
measures undertaken by the Government and the Railways and 
Harbours in the form of'reductions in freight rates,grading 
charges, and giving outright subsidies, the producers' 
position did not alter significantly, as the market price of 
maize did not recover substantially in 1930's. As the market 
was freely organised at the time, the export price determined 
the local price of maize, and many European farmers felt they 
would be unable to recoup the costs of growing maize at such, 
price level. 
On the other hand, commercialisation of African maize 
production was accelerated during this period. In terms of 
• opportunity costs, maize was still more profitable at this 
price level than any other crop they could'grow at that time 
(more high-price cash crops such as coffee, tea and pyrethrum 
were not yet grown widely). The increasing commercialisation 
of African maize production was helped by favourable weather, 
use of better seed, greater number of available agricultural 
extendion workers, and greater competition among the-buyers, 
including the K.E.A.(The Kenya•Earner's Association), in the 
Native Reserve areas. 
The Marketing of Native Produce Ordinance, 1935 was 
designed chiefly to set up Native Produce Markets in the 
Native Reserves in such a way as to completely separate produce 
buying from the business of retail shopping, and to license 
such produce buyers in order to ensure cash payment to growers, 
uniform quality standards, etc. but it was also contemplated 
as a measure enabling the K.E.A. to purchase the bulk of African 
grown maize. The K.E.A. was given an entry to the native 
markets through renting the Local Native Council go-downs. 1 
By this means it tried to obtain control of the whole maize 
market in Kenya and thus be in a position to control supply of 
African-grown maize going onto the internal market, thus raising 
the internal sale.price and forcing the consuming interests and 
possibly African producers to subsidise the European-grown 
maize. In practice it was unsuccessful owing to keen 
competition from other buyers. 
It is extremely difficult to know the exact amount of 
African-grown maize marketed at but some indication 
can be obtained from the figures for maize passing through the 
inspection centres in Nyanza and Central Provinces. 
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TABLE 1 
' COMMERCIALISATION OF AFRICAN GROWN MAIZE, 1936-40 
Year Nyanza Province 
(Inspection Returns) 
Central Province 
(Sales outside the Dis. 
Total ) 
('000 bags) ('000 bags) ('000 bags) 
1936 157 • 180 337 
1937 ,247 .193 440 
1938 314 .384 698 
1939 400 326 726 
1940 • 556 176 732 
Sources Kenya, Food Shortage Commission Report 1943* p. 10 
Considerable quantities of African grown maize in Central Province 
were sold direct to the neighbour European owned plantations which 
escaped inspection and therefore do not appear in these figures. 
This significant buying element would of course, have hampered the 
K.F.A.'s objective of covering a significant quantity of African 
maize and pulling-it off the market. 
With the failure to shift the "export loss burden" onto other 
sections of the- community, the European acreage of maize declined^ 
ra*pidly. The 233 >973 acres of maize harvested in 1929-30 had shrunk 
to 93?517 acres by the 1939-40 seasons, (see Table 2) 
War-time Control and the Production Drive; 
During the-early war years, an Italian invasion from the north 
seemed imminent, and the recruitment of men to the armed forces 
was naturally'given priority over food crop production. Demand for 
maize in overseas markets shrank, and lack of ships made transport 
very difficult. However, the Abyssinian Campaign ended in 1941, 
leading to a shift in priority for the use of manpower from military 
purposes to agricultural production. In this year the demand for all 
food''products to supply the Middle Eastern countries began to be 
felt,3 -fc^  Kenya Government made an all out drive for increasing 
production. 
Emphasis was given to European-grown maize from which quick 
results could be expected, rather than to Agrican-grown maize. To 
this end the Government in 1942 brought in two important pieces of 
legislation - The Increased Production of Crops Ordinance (which 
applied to non-Agrican producers only) and the Defence (Control of 
Maize) Regulations. The former gave the farmer a guaranteed fixed 
price and a guaranteed minimum return in case of unavoidable crop 
failure. Production orders were given to the farmer, and after 
harvest, he was required to keep the crop as Government property until 
ordered by the Maize Centrol to evacuate the crop.^ There was also 
a grant for breaking and clearing new land. Under the Defence 
(Control of Maize) Regulations, Maize Control was established and 
designated as the sole purchaser of maize, the K.F.A. becoming sole 
agents for Maize Control in the European areas. 
In African areas Maize Control established a system of buying 
agents and stores maintaining as far as possible the pre-existing 
channels of trade. The African producer was guaranteed a fixed price 
delivered to the buying agents which was considerably below the fixed 
price paid-to-the European maize grower. This differential•took into 
account various services such as handling, bagging, storage, 
transporting and delivering maize to stores, mills or railhead. 
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While this production drive was being initiated Kenya was'hit "by 
a servere food shortage in 1942-43 which led to the appointment of 
the Pood Shortage Commission of Inquiry in 1943. 
The Commission attributed the shortage to a number of causes 
some of them still prevailing in more recent years. These weres-
1. An increase in the consumption of maize. 
2. More maize being fed to stock. 
3. Large profits obtainable by not delivering maize to the 
Control. 
4. The very low price prevailing in the 1941/42 season 
discouraged planting in African areas. The European maize 
acreage had remained low. 
The Report thought that the main reason for the shortage was 
the rapid increase in maize consumption due to the presence of the 
armed forces in the Colony and the increasing number of Africans in 
employment over the period from 1940 to 1942. This factor was not 
appreciated owing to the lack of sufficient information concerning 
changes on the demand side. The shortage was inevitable, and the 
failure of the short rains in 1942 merely made matters worse.5 
The recommendations of the Commission laid stress on the 
importance of European grown maize;-"European grown maize is indispe-
nsable to the Colony's requirements in normal times. Government 
should enter into a contract, through the agency of the K.E.A. to 
purchase about 400,000 bags of European grown maize per annum at 
a price fixed after consulting producing and consuming interests."6 
The Commission also recommended that the exportable surplus should be 
kept as small as possible and that future policy should not be ifhe 
encouragement of the production of maize for export. The Commission 
approved the disparity in price between European-grown maize at Shs.9/-
per bag and African-grown maize at Shs.4/90 per bag, and justified 
the difference as representing the element of services borne by the 
European grower himself, such as transport cost to railhead, cost 
of bag,-storage expenses, allowance for average differences in 
quality? and traders commission.7 Another difference was the cess 
for the Native Betterment Eund imposed only on the African-grown 
maize. The Commission also recommended that there should be a basic 
minimum price announced prior to each planting season, and that the 
guaranteed prices should not be greatly in excess of the returns 
obtainable form other agricultural products. 
The importance of the Eood Shortage Commission of Inquiry 
Report, 1943 cannot be overstated. Its recommendations were adopted 
as government policyj and the concept of keeping the exportable 
surplus at a minimum, and the policy of fixed prices announced before 
each season, for all maize,.both for the delivered at railhead and 
at the markets in African areas formed the basis of government policy 
for the next twenty years. 
As the result of the production drive the acreage planted with 
maize in non-African maize showed a gradual increase and so did the 
production. The increase in African production is not known, but 
the increase in the'deliveries to the Maize Control was rather slight 
until after the War, when the price shot up and the increase in the 
African maize deliveries became quite noticeable, (see Table 3). 
Eollowing the .War the question of market reorganisation was 
brought up. In 1946 "The Report and Recommendations upon the 
Development of Agricultural Marketing in Kenya" was presented by 
R.H. Bassett. He recommended that the Government set up a'Market 
Department to take over the functions of the Maize Control, and 
initiate the development of, and provide the executives for Marketing 
Boards which would cover all worthwhile crops. This recommendation 
was, however, rejected by the Government and the Maize Control 
continued to function until 1959. 
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Prom 1942 to 1952, there was an East African Cereals Pool whose ' 
members consisted of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Seyschelles, 
Military Porce stationed in East Africa, and the East African Railways 
and Harbours. Maize was the main cereal stored under the pool and 
its administration was entrusted to the East African Production and 
Supply Council for which the Kenya Maize Control acted as storage and 
distributing agents. The scale of its operations is shown in Table 4. 
This inter-territorial pool system was no doubt beneficial as it 
could utilize the natural complementarities such as differences in 
rainfall, timing of the harvest period, etc. between the territories. 
However, it was discontinued in 1952 and was replaced by an Agreement 
between the Governments of Kenya, Tanganyika and Ugandq. later events 
showed that this new arrangement was not flexible enough to allow the 
smooth flow of maize in inter-territorial trade. 
3. The Ibbotson Committee Report and the Troup Report, 1952. 
As the 1940's gave way to the 1950's there was continual criticism cf 
controls and as a result, the Ibbotson Committee was established to 
make recommendations concerning the future structure of the produce 
marketing organisation. 
"When the Ibbotson Committee sat it was dealing with a continua-
tion of wartime conditions in which the export price of maize was 
higher than the internal price. The Committee's Report emphasised 
that, so long as the internal price was fixed below export parity, 
some form of organised marketing must be retained to ensure that 
equitable sharing amongst all producers of the economic disadvantages 
of having to provide for local requirements before selling maize 
overseas".® The Committee also envisaged a falling export price beiow 
the* internal price in which case an organised market would still «fce 
necessary. 
The Committee concluded the time had come when marketing should 
cease to be controlled under the Defence Regulations and that the 
functions of control should be vested in a Statutory Central Board. 
The responsibilities of the proposed Central Board should be "the 
collection, storage and subsequent distribution of the crop5 for 
advising the Member (Minister) for Agriculture of the quantities 
likely to be available for export and for the carrying out of his 
directions in this respect; for the maintenance of adequate reserves 
in good conditions and for ensuring adequate distribution and 
availability of internal requirements."9 These responsibilities • 
would be exercised by the Board through a small central executive, 
but the functions of collecting, storing and selling the crop would 
be delegated to agents, which would be the K.P.A. in the European 
areas, a Statutory Regional Board in the Nyanza Province and licensed 
traders in the other areas. (Later, another statutory Regional Board 
came into being in the Central Province.) 
Although the government accepted the Ibbotson Report in 
principle, the emergency, the poor financial situation and a severe 
shortage of maize in 1952/53? all delayed the implementation of the 
report's recommendations. Meanwhile there was a sharp decline'in 
the price of maize in overseas markets, and within a few years, the 
major reason for restricting exports shifted drastically from a fear 
of food shortage to the fact that it had become uneconomical. 
While the Ibbotson Committee was deliberating, European producers 
were pressing the Government for a price review. The maize growers in 
the Trans Nzoia passed a resolution in November 1950 asking the 
Government "to appoint an extra-territorial commission to ascertain 
the proper price for the 1950 planted maize crop and to advise 
Government on the type of parmanent machinery for price ascertainment 
in future years which would ensure the removal of this function from 
the sphere of political and other extraneous influences."10 
Consequently, L.G. Troup was appointed so make recommendations on 
the pricc. The Troup Report on the General Economy of Farming in 
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the Highlands presented in May 1952 recommended a formula on which 
production costs should "be calculated as the basis for fixing prices. 
According to this Troup formula the maize price of the 1951 crop was 
raised from the previously fixed level' of Shs.30/30 per bag 
(excluding cost of bag) f.o.r. to Shs.35/-. per bag. Troup had at 
the same time emphasised the necessity in the future for producers 
to take every opportunity of reducing their costs of production, 
thus enabling the price to be reduced to consumers. 
However, an agreement was made in 1954 between the Government 
and the European producers that the Troup formula should be used 
for fixing maize prices until the 1957/58 season. The Troup 
formula served to keep high producer price level based on the 
high-cost maize producers of the Highlands throughout the 1950's 
(see graph l). This formula had proved not to be free from the 
political influence of one seeter. Consequently, maize production 
grew and surpassed the internal requirements of Kenya at the high 
consumer price levels creating a large surplus to be stored or 
disposed of in the low-priced overseas market. The situation was 
not unlike the time of the Great Depression in the 1930's when 
the main concern of the maize industry was how to spread the 
so-called 'export loss' to all maize producers. 
The Agreement between the Government and producers in 1954 
accepted that any losses or gains from the export of maize would 
be to the account of the procuders.H It therefore became necessary 
to establish a Eund to which all maize growers would make contribu-
tions to pay the differentials between the guaranteed internal 
price and the price realised on the export market, and the Maize 
and Sorghum (Imposition of Cess) Ordinance was enacted in 1954 for 
this purpose. The Ordinance provided for the 'imposition of a ce^s 
on all maize delivered which was fixed at Shs.3/- per bag in the 
first year of its implication. 
Establishment of the Maize Marketing Board. 
In 1958, the Government decided the time had come to implement 
the recommendations of the Ibbotson Commission. The Sessional Paper 
No.6 of 1957/58 put forward the actions the Government was proposing 
to take. It stated that the Government would shortly introduce 
legislation to set up a Maize Board to replace the Maize Control 
to market the crop in the best interests of the country as a whole. 
The whole crop, other than maize retained by the grower or bought 
and sold by Africans for consumption within their own districts, 
was to be disposed of as the Maize Board would direct. 
The Sessional Paper criticised the Troup formula in the following 
terms s-
(1) that under the Troup formula and agreement made of the 
Government with the producers, the price of maize has reached 
a level which is damaging not only to the maize industry but 
to the economy of the country, as a whole$ 
(2) more can be done to encourage the local use of maize as food 
for human consumption and in the livestock industry, 
especially if the price to the consumer is lowered; 
(3) the ever increasing difference in the price paid to the 
producer and the price of maize meal to the consumer, which 
is inherent in the functions which the present control is 
required to undetake, must be reduced. 
Accordingly the Sessional P-~per advocated lowering the price 
somewhat. It was unfortunate that the Sessional Paper again mist-
rusted the Africans growers' ability to fulfil the internal 
requirements for maize, in this respect following in the footsteps 
of the Pood Shortage Commission Report'of 1943. The Sessional 
Paper stated that "while certain areas, especially Nyanza, have come 
to rely on maize to a considerable extent as their cash crop, it 
still remains true that the majority of the 600,000 African farmers 
in Kenya plant maize primarily for family subsistence and only 
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secondarily for cash Thus the surplus available for delivery 
to markets is only a small fraction of the whole and is liable to 
fluctuate widely from season to season according to weather 
conditions Since these deliveries cannot be relied on, the 
only other sources of hiiaze are from overseas or from farmers in 
the Scheduled areas."13 • 
A dynamic approach to the African peasant farmer to desengage 
them from subsistence farming and turn'them to commercial farming 
could not be expected from this policy, and the initiation of 
African maize growers in this direction in the later 1930's had 
long been forgotton. The Maize Marketing Board came into being 
through the enactment of the Maize Marketing Ordinance in 1959. 
Accordin to the Ordinance the functions of the Board ares-
(a) to regulate, control and improve the collection, storage, 
marketing, distribution and supply of maize and maize 
products? 
(b) to buy, sell, import,export and otherwise acquire and 
dispose of maize products... in order, so far as possible, 
to fulfil the requirements both of consumers and producers 
in the Colony? 
(c) to advise the Minister on the proper relation of maize 
production to the needs of the Colony? and on the extent 
to which control over the importation and exportation of 
maize and maize products is necessary or desirable.^ 
The price to be paid by the Board was to be fixed by the Minister 
of Agriculture, after consultation with the Board and producers' 
representatives with the approval of the Council of Ministers. 
Among the other wide powers confered upon the Board was that to* 
prohibit or direct the movement of maize or maize 'products within 
the Colony or any part of the Colony. The Ordinance provided 
extensive powers for the investigation'of offences and punisment 
of offenders. (Despite this provision, the illegal trade between 
districts and across the Uganda/Kenya border has been wide spread. 
See graph 2 for the defferential in price between Uganda and Kenya 
around the border area.) 
The policy of restricting the movement of foodstuffs is of 
long standing in East Africa.15 in the past the governments of 
East Africa has frequently had to institute famine relief measures 
in particular areas. However it cannot be denied that the fear 
of famine among the officials has caused them to adopt an over-rigid 
self-sufficiency policy of food production. The problem was Very 
well expounded by the East African Royal Commission Report 1953-1955» 
in its chapter on the Marketing and Distributive Systems 
"In the policies which they (the East African Governments) have 
adopted they have been unduly influenced by fears and practices 
of the indigenous populations, and by encouraging district, regional 
and even territorial self-sufficiency they have perpetuated the 
cause of the evil which their measures were intended to combat, 
namely the system of self-sufficiency itself. In their anxiety 
to achieve security in the matter of food supplies they have 
tended to regard the ordinary mechanism of the market as an 
obstacle to the solution of their difficulties rather than as 
a solvent of the problem. Instead of encouraging specialization 
and the free sale of surplus production of food and other agricul-
tural products in suitable areas in order to even out shortages' 
in other areas by the use of the normal machinery of the market, 
government policy has frequently looked upon the normal functioning 
of the market with suspicion."16 
The functions of the Maize Marketing Board have been and are 
still t),ound up with this traditional self-sufficiency policy. 
The Board does not in any way put preassure on the subsistence 
farmers to produce maize above what they themselves regard as 
surplus to their own needs. The money mechanism - cash liquidity, 
effective'demand and price - which would allow the people in a food 
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shortage area to offer higher prices to attract mcie maize from the 
areas where food was relatively abundant is annihilated by the 
fixed price system. The Board's policy of limiting the number 
of licenced buying agents and sub-agents and giving them a fixed 
commission per bag of maize collected .does not give these 
licencees as much incentive to act as entrepreuers and spread 
the area and extent of commercialisation as under the competitive 
buying system. The speed with which chains of traders can detect 
areas of food scarcity and food surplus and move foodstuffs from 
the latter to the'former areas is, provided there are enough 
competing traders, likely to be far more efficient than with 
a centrally directed and bureaucratically staffed organisation 
like the Maize Marketing Board.1' Actual experience in Kenya in 
shortage years such as 1965 lend considerable support to this view. 
In addition, the cess system adopted by the Maize Marketing 
Board encourages self-sufficiency. There are two kinds of cesses 
in question; one is the Maize Fund Cess which was originally ins-
tituted by the Maize and Sorghum (Imposition of Cess) Ordinance, 
1954 and was succeeded by the Maize Marketing Ordinance of 1959? 
and the other is the African District Council Cess imposed only 
on African delivered maize, which was initiated by the. Maize 
Control in 1942. Although this was not provided in the Maize 
Makrketing Ordincance of 1959, the Board agreed to undetake the 
role of tax collector on behalf of District Council. The latter 
cess was not liked by the Board itself 18 but was accepted by it 
because of its administrative convenience. These cesses greatly 
reduce the producers price relative to the consumers' price; the 
wider the gap between the two, the more is eselfsufficiency 
encouraged. 
The operation of the Maize Marketing Board has been the 
object of criticisms since its inception. The MacGillivray 
Committee Report on the organisation of agriculture of 1960 
stated that it received a number of criticisms of Marketing 
Boards (particularly the Nyanza Province and Central Province 
Marketing Boards) from chambers of commerce, produce exchanges 
and other commercial bodies. "It has been proposed that these 
boards should have advisory functions only and should be concerned 
only with production, leaving marketing and distribution entirely 
to the trade. As a corollary of this, it has advocated that the 
Maize Marketing Board should be severely- restricted in its 
operations and that the marketing of maize should be undertaken 
by producers through their co-operatives or normal trade channels; 
that government through the board, should merely fix a producer 
price and purchase sufficient stocks against famine risks, but 
should leave the marketing of maize to the trade."19 
However the MacGillivray Report very skillfully avoided 
examining these criticisms saying that "we are not required to 
recommend any major changes in policy. Thus, whereas the 
criticisms and comment thereon which we have'received have provided 
us with a valuable background to the problem, they are not directly 
relevant to our terms of reference and we do not regard it as part 
of our duty to examine and express views on them." 20 
A comprehansive critique of the Kenya maize control system 
can be found in M.P.Miraclete article in the East African Economics 
Review (1959). He argues that Maize control severely inhibits 
economic development on the following four points: 
1. The abandonment of the free operation of market forces 
in price determination means resources are inefficiently 
allocated. 
2. It means that labour is costlier than it need be, as maize 
is the staple foodstuff for labour. 
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3. Livestock production is made more expensi .e to the consumer 
and less profitable to the producer through the high price 
maize? development of this infant industry (especially the 
pork industry) is retarded. This criticism has "been now met, 
in the case of "bacon by rebates on the cost of maize fed 
to bacon pigs. 
4. "In African areas, Maize Control severely retards on of 
the most fundamental changes in the organisation of 
production that must come in the development of a economy -
a greater specialisation of production."21 
A Working Party to examine the operation of the Maize Marketing-
Board was established by the Board itself at its meeting held on 
24th November, 1961. The Working Party was to "ascertain if it is 
possible, while maintaining reasonable stability in the maize 
industry of Kenya, to provide a more flexible system of organised 
marketing and whilst so d-'.ing to consider whether in fact any 
organised system is necessary." 22 
Various views were put forward to the Working Party. One view 
stated that a greater flexibility might be achieved by the gradual 
development of organised marketing of maize through Co-operative 
Organisations with a pyramid structure from district level, to 
regional level to National level; It was felt that at the primary 
marketing level, the producers should be free to market their crop 
either through the District Co-operative Societies or through a 
trader. However, the Acting Commissioner for Co-operative 
Department "made it' quite clear that his Department was not yet 
geared to undertake properly and efficiently a scheme of this 
magnitude. ,.23 
The K.F.A. advanced the view that it should be chosen as the 
national co-operative organisation which would act as managing 
agents to a small Statutory Board which would be purely advisory. 
All District and Regional Co-operatives would become sub-agents to 
the K.F.A.24 
• A plan submitted by K.P. Shah was given much attention. 
According to his plan, free trade would be permitted between 
a fixed minimum and maximum price payable to producers. The object 
of the scheme would be to permit millers and traders to trade freely 
in Kenya (or even inter-territorially) within these price margins. 
The Maize Price Stabilisation Board would be set up to intervence 
when the price goes below the minimum by buying the maize at the 
minimum price, and when the price goes above the maximum the Board 
releases the stock at the maximum price. The Working Party saw 
some merit in the scheme, but calculated that under the prices 
suggested by Mr. Shah, the Stabilisation Board would have to bear an 
annual deficit of about £60,000 or more, as the Board would become 
"nothing more than a dumping ground for all She maize surplus to 
the requirements of the .country."25 (Although it is already that 
under the present system in years of good harvest). 
Although rejected by the Working Party, this scheme might 
have provided, an alternative which in many wqys would be superior 
to the present Marketing Board policies. 
The prices to be decided as the floor- (minimum) and the 
ceiling (maximum) are certainly difficult to determine without 
experience, but a minimum price fixed relatively close to export 
parity, combined with a flexible import policy could make the 
system work fairly well. 
The most recent comprehensive investigation on the Kenya Maize 
Industry was made by V.G-. Mathews in 1963. The main concern of the 
Mathew Report was such questions as i-
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(a) How is "the industry likely to be affected by the introduction 
of the new hybrid and synthetic maize, the new Settlement 
Scheme, and the new circumstances brought about by 
Independence? 
(b.) What should Kenya '.s policy be in regard to the export of 
maize? 
(c) How does the price of maize and other factors affect the production of the crop, and what steps can be taken to 
.reduce the price of maize to the consumer? 
(d) Should the system of organised marketing be retained?^ 
Mathew concluded that with the introduction of hybrid and • 
synthetic maize the productivity of maize per acre will increse, 
although the effect of the new Settlement Schemes would reduce the 
delivery of maize from those areas. Thus "calculations aimed at 
deciding a fair internal guaranteed price should in future employ 
a factor of 10 bags to the acre as opposed to the 8 bags factor 
used in the Troup Formula."27 If adopted universally, hybrid maize 
could yield the average of 15 bags to the acre', and make a rapid 
reduction of price possible. Thus, "from Shs.,30/- in 1964 the 
price should be reduced in each successive year by equal steps to 
Shs.24/- in 1968." The reduction in the producers price would 
make maize export profitable in future, but until such time comes, 
"Kenya should not encourage surplus maize production for the 
purpose of export." The Rep art endorsed the necessity of organised 
marketing, stating "so long as there is a need to fix a guaranteed 
internal price different from export parity so long will there''be 
need for a degree of control similar to that at present exercised by 
the Maize Marketing Board."28 
The Board proceeded to follow Mathews' recommendation of 
reducing the guaranteed price, with a reduction of Shs.3/- in 1963 
to Shs.32/50 per bag F.O.R. and Sh.l/- in 1964 to Shs.31/50.29 
However, in the middle of 1964 the Board foresaw a coming shortage 
of maize and on 25th July of the- same year an.announcement was made 
to raise the price again to Shs.32/50. This did not stave off the 
tide, and a large-scale maize shortage occured in 1965. 
The shortcomings of the Mathews Recommendations seem to lie 
in advocating a reduction of price with immediate effect before 
many growers were accustomed to the higher yielding seeds. Had the 
growers experienced the profitability of the hybrid and the 
synthetic seeds they could have confidence in increasing income 
even with the reduction of .price per bag, ,an& thus a decline in 
maize planting could have been halted. Another point which is 
relevant here is that any reduction in the maize price'must "coincide 
with a reduction for the other close alternative crops, otherwise it 
will affect the relative profitability of crops that can be grown 
on the same land. The recent increases in the price for wheat have 
surely induced the maize growers to switch to wheat. The whole 
experience suggests how' difficult"it is to reduce a fixed price 
under the system of control. Competition through the price 
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OPERATION OP THE EAST AFRICAM CEREALS POOL 
1942/45 to 1951/52 
Years (ended) 11943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 Total 
(a) Balances from the previous years - 21 499 188 66 323 78 226 352 310 
(To) Pool Contributions frok Kenya Nil 1,193 1,150 759 1,132 587 1,004 1,204 1,244 1,472 9,745 l^ inciuaing naize) — - ;i,12l) (357) (856) (504) ( 813) (1,153) (1,057) (1,472) (7,332) 
(cN Pool Contributions fron Uganda - 243 465 91 422 467 217 266 107 - 2,278 
(ds Pool Contributions fron Tanganyika - 17 35 65 28 81 - - 46 33 305 
(e) Unknown - - - - - - 32 - 5 126 163 
(t) Total E.A. Pool Contributions Nil 1,453 1,650 915 1,582 1,135 1,253 1,470 1,402 1,631 12,491 
= (b)+(c)+(d)+(e) 
(g) Imports 507 1,155 — — 68 — — 20 — — 1,750 
(h) Total Receipts (a)+(f)+(g) 507 2,629 2,149 1,102 1,717 1,458 1,331 1,716 1,753 1,941 14,241 
(i} Issues of Cereals to Kenya 206 1,322 1,031 455 368 536 313 379 758 864 6,232 
,1 Issues of Cereals to Uganda ) 176 20 7 4 27 83 26 44 40 427) (k; Issues of Cereals to Tanganyika )280 242 196 337 400 36 368 843 Nil — 2,422) + 
(1 Issues of Cereals to Zanzibar ) 390 340 218 163 164 128 105 112 86 1,706 ) Seychelles, Military, EAR&K, 
including Transit losses and 
(n) 
Shrinkage Nil Nil 374 19 459 617 213 11 529 951 3,174 Exports 
(n) Total Disposals 486 2,130 1,961 1,036 1,394 1,380 1,105 1,364 1,443 1,941 14,241 
All figures represents Cereals (not only naize) in 1000 "bags of standard weight of 200 lb. net. 
n Kenya Maize Marketing Board, the East African Cereals Pool Piles. 
' Kenya, Sessonal Paper No.6 of 1957/53 "The Maize Industry". 
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